

SHORTER NOTES

ARISTOPHANES, *WASPS* 897: κλῶος κύκινος

At the beginning of the dog's trial the prosecution state the charge and the penalty they propose. It seems to me that there may be a more complicated joke here than is generally realized. The penalty of a collar is appropriate for a dog and in real life was sometimes imposed on a slave or a prisoner (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 11). The epithet applied to the collar is usually translated 'of fig-wood' and taken to be a pun on *κυκοφάντης*. Commentators see the same pun earlier in the play at 145, although in that passage the sense may be adequate without the pun; the adjective *κύκινος* does not necessarily constitute a joke in itself but is perhaps chosen deliberately to lead into the joke. And in the only other passage in Aristophanes where *κύκινος* occurs, *Plutus* 946, it has an association with *κυκοφάντης* because the lines are spoken by an informer.

But even if there is a play on words in 897, I think that a further element of humour would be added if one could take *κύκινος* as meaning 'of figs', a sense attested by L.S.J. in Hellenistic and later Greek. A collar of figs was worn by *φαρμακοί*, the two ritual scapegoats expelled annually from Athens at the Thargelia.¹ Similar collars were also worn by *κανηφόροι* at various other festivals (cf. e.g. Ar. *Lys.* 647), but since they were nearly always female this connotation of a collar of figs would not naturally occur to the audience. To say that the dog, if found guilty, deserves the treatment accorded to scapegoats has the added point that exile was a common penalty at Athens for serious offences.

Lincoln College, Oxford

N. G. WILSON

¹ L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin, 1932, repr. Darmstadt, 1962), 179 f., 196 f.

ARISTOTLE, *DE INSOMNIIS* 462^a18

οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα πάν

THE interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of *φάντασμα* in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images.¹

I quote the Oxford translation of 462^a15–24 (by J. I. Beare): 'From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (*φάντασμα*), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. *Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream.* For in the first place, some persons [when asleep] actually, in a certain way, perceive sounds, light, savour,

¹ I owe this point to Richard Sorabji.

and contact; feebly, however, and as it were remotely. For there have been cases in which persons while asleep, but with the eyes partly open, saw faintly in their sleep (as they supposed) the lights of a lamp, and afterwards, on being awakened, straightway recognized it as the actual light of a real lamp.¹

On this interpretation *φάντασμα* refers forward to the light really seen, with partly open eyes, and to the real sounds described in the sentence which follows the quotation. With one exception, all translators and commentators, ancient, medieval, and modern, appear to agree with this interpretation. But it would make equally good sense to translate our sentence, 'Nor is everything that is experienced in sleep a *phantasm*', which is also the interpretation of the *Nova translatio*: 'neque quod in sompno fantasma omne.'

This can be defended by starting from the definition of a dream at 462^a16 as *φάντασμα μὲν τι καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ*. This has two parts: only what is both a *phantasm* and occurs in sleep is a dream. Lines 16–18 touch on cases of *phantasmata* which are not dreams because they are observed while awake: 18–25, on the other hand, fits into its place as a consideration of events in sleep which are not dreams because they are not *phantasmata*. Finally in lines 29–30 there is an implied distinction between *phantasmata* and *aisthemata* which would confirm this view.

University of Liverpool

PAMELA M. HUBY

¹ I owe this point to Richard Sorabji.

A KOMOS IN VALERIUS AEDITUUS

Quid faculam praefers, Phileros, qua est nil opus nobis?
 ibimus sic, lucet pectore flamma satis.
 istam nam potis est vis saeva extinguere venti
 aut imber caelo candidus praecipitans.
 at contra hunc ignem Veneris, nisi si Venus ipsa,
 nullast quae possit vis alia opprimere.

(Valerius Aedituus *fr.* 1 = Gell. 19. 9. 12)

THE setting of this epigram is the komos sequence explored by Copley in his important book.¹ The speaker is about to set forth in the dark, since he requires some means of lighting his way. A companion offers him a torch.² It is refused as unnecessary because of the flame of love³ which burns in his breast. That will suffice for the passage through the streets—*ibimus sic*. The reasons for rejecting the torch also allude to the conventions of the incident. The *exclusus amator* is regularly buffeted by wind and soaked by rain,⁴ the elemental forces which

¹ F. O. Copley, *Exclusus Amator. A Study in Latin Love Poetry* (1956).

² For the torch as a feature of the komos cf. *Ar. Ec.* 692, *Pl.* 1041, *Antiph.* 199. 2, *Herod.* 2. 35, *A.P.* 12. 117. 1, 4 (Meleager), *Hor. Carm.* 3. 26. 6–7, *S.* 1. 4. 52, *Prop.* 1. 16. 8, *Ael. V.H.* 13. 1, *Charito.* 1. 3. 2.

³ For the metaphor in general cf. A. S. Pease, *Publi Vergilii Maronis Aeneidos Liber*

Quartus (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), 86–7; for it in komastic contexts cf. *Theoc.* 3. 17, [*Theoc.*] 23. 7, 16, 25–6, 34, *Lyr. Alex. Adesp.* 1. 15–16, 24, *A.P.* 5. 189. 4 (Asclepiades), 12. 83. 3–6 (Meleager), 85. 7 (Meleager), 116. 4.

⁴ Cf. *A.P.* 5. 167 (Asclepiades), 189 (Asclepiades), 12. 167 (Meleager), *Hor. Carm.* 1. 25. 9–12, 3. 10. 1–8, 19–20, *Tib.* 1. 2. 32, *Prop.* 1. 16. 24, *Ov. Am.* 1. 6. 51–6.